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Abstract
We analyze credence goods markets in the case of two ﬁrms. Consumers
know that the quality of the good varies but do not know which ﬁrm is of
high quality. First, we show that the high quality producer may be unable to
monopolize the market, or even to survive in some cases, in situations where
it is eﬃcient and trusted by all consumers. Second, although a label restoring
full information improves welfare, it may also reduce both ﬁrms’ proﬁts by
intensifying competition. Since even the high quality producer may not wish
to label its product, in such cases the label must be mandatory. Third, an
imperfect label which moves everybody’s beliefs closer to the truth without
restoring full information may produce adverse results on market structure
and welfare, either by increasing or by reducing the variance of beliefs.
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11 Introduction
In many instances consumers are aware of the existence of two ﬁrms producing
goods of diﬀerent qualities but do not know which ﬁrm sells the higher quality. Re-
peated purchases can in some cases reveal the good’s quality (experience goods). In
other cases, however, consumers cannot tell the quality of the good they have pur-
chased even after consuming it (credence goods).1 In many instances, a recognized
authority can certify a product’s quality after inspection and grant a recognizable la-
bel, thus helping consumers to make an informed choice. Common intuition suggests
that a) a quality label that improves before-purchase information always increases
welfare, and b) a high quality producing ﬁrm will always be willing to undergo the
necessary inspection in order to reveal its product’s quality to consumers, unless the
veriﬁcation cost is too high.2 Hence, voluntary labelling schemes may be a viable
alternative to mandatory labelling.
We show that in an oligopolistic market of credence goods where consumers
cannot identify the high quality seller, both of the preceding conjectures may be
incorrect. First, labels that do not restore full information but only partially improve
consumers’ perception on which ﬁrm sells the high quality product may reduce
welfare by reducing the market share of the ﬁrm that sells the high quality. Second,
our analysis limits the scope of voluntary labels by showing situations where both
ﬁrms wish to avoid labelling because it would result in more intense competition
and lower proﬁts.
Whether a good is a credence good is related, for example, to long run health
eﬀects that are invisible within a long period after consumption, or to direct pref-
1Examples of credence goods are organic products, fair trade products, types of goods claiming
higher safety or better environmental performance, etc. The classiﬁcation into experience and
credence goods follows Nelson (1970), Darby and Karny (1973) and Roe and Sheldon (2007).
2Information improving labels also increase welfare in the case of experience goods. However,
their use in the case of credence goods is considered more urgent, due to the intensity of the
informational problem. See Crespi and Marette (2003) for a survey on the economic issues related
to public labeling.
2erence for the production process. Prime examples in the ﬁrst category are organic
produce and Genetically Modiﬁed Organisms (GMO’s). Fertilizer-produced grain,
fruit, or vegetables are alleged to have harmful long term health eﬀects of which their
organic counterparts are supposed to be free. Similar long term health considera-
tions are raised against the consumption of GMO’s. In both these cases consumers
are aware of the existence of two product types, but they cannot distinguish their
preferred type from the health damaging one even after consuming the good.
Preference for the production process may also arise independently of the prod-
uct’s physical properties when consumers take into consideration “ethical” issues.
Many consumers accept to pay a higher price for “fair trade coﬀee” simply because
it guarantees that coﬀee farmers receive adequate payment. Similarly, consumers
are willing to pay a premium for the products of “ethically correct” ﬁrms over
the price they pay for similar products from their pure-proﬁt maximizing rivals. In
other cases, goods may be preferred simply because their production is environmen-
tally less harmful than that of otherwise similar substitutes.3 Again, even repeated
consumption cannot reveal quality.4
Credence goods markets diﬀer signiﬁcantly from experience goods markets be-
cause reputation and signalling can rarely be used to alleviate informational prob-
lems. When there is adverse selection in a credence goods market, consumers can
only base their purchase decision on subjective beliefs about each available prod-
uct’s quality.5 These beliefs are based on all available information, including press
3The case of “green electricity” is such an example. Despite the fact that green electricity is
neither more eﬃcient, nor does it represent a smaller hazard to its user in any way, some consumers
have a taste for its production process (less polluting) and are willing to pay a premium for it.
4Health and ethical issues are two diﬀerent quality attributes even if they refer to the same
good. Thus, on the coﬀee package of a typical small coﬀee seller in Montreal (Santropol) one
can ﬁnd two diﬀerent labels: the TRANSFAIR logo and the organic product certiﬁcation by the
Organic Crop Improvement Association (OCIA). TRANSFAIR claims to be a ... “symbol of “Fair
Trade” partnership with cooperatives of coﬀee farmers around the world” and “ [the] guarantee
that these farmers have been paid a fair price for their labour [...].” The OCIA label certiﬁes that
all coﬀees sold at that place are “shade grown without artiﬁcial fertilizers, pesticides or herbicides
[...].”
5For moral hazard in credence goods markets see Marette et al. (2000), Fulton and Giannakas
3reports, word-of-mouth, labels, etc., and may diﬀer among consumers, due to dif-
ferences in consumers’ ability to absorb and/or treat information. Most important,
each consumer’s beliefs about a credence good’s quality cannot be updated after
consumption. Since the production of bad quality cannot be detected and punished,
no producer can build reputation. Signalling is also very diﬃcult since the delayed
detection of bad quality allows its producer to imitate the strategy of their good
quality rivals.6
In this paper we analyze market structure and the eﬃciency of labels in a cre-
dence goods market, using a duopoly model inspired by the work of Gabszewicz
and Grilo (1992). Consumers are similar in their tastes but have diﬀering beliefs on
the trustworthiness of each ﬁrm. When all consumers attribute a probability higher
than .5 to a single ﬁrm as being the high quality producer, we say that this ﬁrm is
trusted. Contrary to Gabszewicz and Grilo (1992),w ea s s u m et h a tp r o d u c t i o no f
the higher quality requires higher marginal costs and call “eﬃcient” the ﬁrm whose
product yields the higher net surplus (after subtracting marginal cost) under full
information.
We know summarize our three main results. First, there are situations where,
despite the fact that the high quality producer is both eﬃcient and trusted, the low
quality producer can ﬁn dap r i c ea b o v em a r g i n a lc o s ts u c ht h a ti ts h r i n k st h eh i g h
quality ﬁrm’s market share to zero. Whether the low quality producer will allow
the survival of its high quality rival depends on the width of the beliefs distribution.
When beliefs are highly dispersed, the dominant low quality ﬁrm prefers to enjoy
a higher price while leaving a market share for its rival. With narrowly dispersed
beliefs competition is stiﬀ and equilibrium prices do not allow the high quality pro-
(2004), Lapan and Moschini (2007), Roe and Sheldon (2007) and Garella and Petrakis (2007).
6The most common signals are price distortion (Shapiro, 1983), advertising (Tirole, 1988), and
warranties (Palfrey and Romer, 1983). The prospect of repeated purchases allows the high quality
producer of an experience good to signal her quality by sacriﬁcing present for future proﬁts, a
strategy that her low quality counterpart cannot imitate. While reputation and signalling may
be helpful in experience goods markets, such strategies are generally impossible in credence goods
markets, due to the slow revelation of product quality.
4ducer to cover its marginal cost. Since welfare maximization under full information
requires that all consumers purchase the high quality, the situation is ineﬃcient
independently of whether the low quality chooses to eliminate its rival from the
market. Thus, the informational problems may prevent high quality credence goods
from obtaining the eﬃcient market share.7
Second, while perfect labels solve the problem, they also intensify competition
and may reduce both ﬁrms’ proﬁts. While such outcome is desirable to the extent
that it beneﬁts consumers, it also implies that voluntary labelling may not be func-
tional, since even the high quality producer may in some cases wish to avoid it. In
those situations mandatory labelling may be the appropriate solution.
Imperfect labels are those that, while moving all or some consumers’ beliefs
towards the right direction, do not restore full information. Our third result is that
such labels may aﬀect welfare by not only aﬀecting average beliefs, but also the
beliefs’ dispersion. We show cases where an imperfect label that moves everybody’s
beliefs closer to the truth ends up producing adverse results on market structure
and welfare, by either increasing or reducing the variance of beliefs.
The paper is organized as follows: the next section presents the basic model and
analyzes equilibrium without labels. Section 3 examines the issues of both perfect
and imperfect labels. Concluding remarks are presented in Section 4.
2 Market equilibrium
Assume two versions of a product, a high quality type (type h)a n dal o wq u a l i t y
type (type l), produced at constant marginal costs cj, j = h,l, respectively, with
ch >c l.A l lﬁxed costs are zero and, without loss of generality, we normalize cl =0 .
All consumers buy one unit of the product or none at all and derive utility Uj > 0,
7Even worse, under a narrow beliefs dispersion, eﬃciency and consumer trust may not be able
to even save the high quality product from complete elimination! Note that in our model the
small market share of credence goods and the resulting ineﬃciency are not due to the presence of
externalities. Adding the latter onto the picture makes, of course, things worse.
5j = h,l with Uh >U l. Each type of product is produced by a diﬀerent ﬁrm i and
sold at price pi, i =1 ,2. We assume that the high quality is produced by ﬁrm 2,s o
U2 = Uh,c 2 = ch and U1 = Ul,c 1 = cl. All consumers have identical tastes given
by: V = Ui − pi,i =1 , 2,i ft h e yp u r c h a s ef r o mﬁrm i, V =0 , otherwise.
Prices are expressed in terms of a Hicksian numéraire. If both products are
oﬀered at equal prices, under full information all consumers buy from ﬁrm 2.I f ,
on the other hand, both products are oﬀered at prices reﬂecting marginal costs,
consumers favor unanimously ﬁrm 2 (ﬁrm 1)w h e nr ≡ ∆/(c2 − c1) > (<)1,w h e r e
∆ ≡ Uh−Ul. The high (low) quality is then called eﬃcient quality and its producer,
ﬁrm 2 (ﬁrm 1), is called eﬃcient ﬁrm, since it creates a higher amount of net social
surplus. Firms set prices simultaneously (Bertrand competition).
We assume that consumers are a) aware of the existence of two qualities, b) aware
of the exact product characteristics,8 c) totally ignorant about production costs, d)
able to identify whether a product is made by ﬁrm 1 or 2, and e) uncertain about
which ﬁrm sells the high quality.9 With respect to the latter, they form subjective
probabilities based on all available information, including word-of-mouth.
Following Gabszewicz and Grilo (1992), we assume that a consumer is identiﬁed
by a subjective probability α ∈ [0,1] she assigns to event E:“ ﬁrm 1 sells the high
quality product and ﬁrm 2 sells the low quality one”. Since ﬁrm 1 is by assumption
the low quality producer, the lower the α of a speciﬁc consumer is, the closer that
consumer’s beliefs are to the truth. We say that a consumer with α>1
2 “trusts” ﬁrm
1 since she attributes higher probability on ﬁrm 1 being the high quality producer;
when α<1
2 the consumer trusts ﬁrm 2. We assume the consumer population
distributed over a set of probabilities S =[ α,α], with 0 ≤ α < α ≤ 1,a c c o r d i n g
to a uniform distribution with density (α − α)−1. We assume that ﬁrms know the
8I.e., they perfectly know the consequences of consuming the high or the low quality.
9In our analysis consumers are certain that both product types are available in the market.
Allowing consumers to assess positive probabilities to the events that only one product type (high
or low quality) is sold by both ﬁrms complicates the analysis without adding anything signiﬁcant
to the results.
6beliefs distribution, while consumers do not.10 When 1/2 > α (<α ), all consumers
trust ﬁrm 2 (ﬁrm 1), while for 1/2 ∈ S consumer trust is split between the two ﬁrms.
Trusting a ﬁrm does not necessarily mean buying from it, since the actual choice
depends on relative prices, as well. The expected utility a consumer α derives from
consuming a product is: αUh+(1−α)Ul −p1, for good 1,a n d(1−α)Uh+αUl −p2,
for good 2.
At equal prices, all consumers buy from the ﬁrm they trust. When 1/2 / ∈ S the
model is reminiscent of vertical diﬀerentiation since consumers rank products unan-
imously, while for 1/2 ∈ S the model resembles horizontal diﬀerentiation. Recall,
though, that diﬀerentiation does not stem from product characteristics—which are
unobservable—but from initial beliefs; hence, it may well be that for some set of ini-
tial beliefs all consumers favor (erroneously) ﬁrm 1. We do not formally investigate
the formation of such beliefs. Instead, we perform comparative statics for diﬀerent
sets of beliefs.
At given prices, the consumer just indiﬀerent between the two products is the








We assume that in equilibrium the market is fully covered, and therefore, sales










.W h e nαm(.) / ∈ S,o n eﬁrm’s
sales vanish (monopoly). We deﬁne as “dominant” the ﬁrm that can ﬁnd a price
above marginal cost such that reduces its rival’s market share to zero. In other words,
the dominant ﬁrm has the possibility of monopolizing the market at a price that
does not incur losses. Under full information, the eﬃcient ﬁrm is also dominant
since it creates higher net surplus. Under incomplete information, eﬃciency and
d o m i n a n c em a yn o tc o i n c i d es i n c et h el a t t e ri n v o l v e sa l s oc o n s u m e r sb e l i e f s . T h e
lemma below describes when each ﬁrm is in the dominant position.


























no ﬁrm is dominant.
Proof. See Appendix 1.
T h ef a c tt h a tad o m i n a n tﬁrm can monopolize the market does not also mean
that it wishes to do so in equilibrium. The necessary and suﬃcient condition for







≡ f(α),a n ds i m i l a r l y ,D2 > 0 if and only if
α>2α − 1
2(1 − 1
r) ≡ g(α) (see Appendix 1). It is now easy to show that
Proposition 1 A) When the low quality is eﬃcient (r ∈ [0,1]), then i) ﬁrm 1 is
also dominant, and ii) ﬁrm 2 must be trusted at least by some consumers in order
to survive. B) When the high quality is eﬃcient (r ∈ [1,+∞)), then i) ﬁrm 2 may
well not be the dominant ﬁrm; ii) there are cases where ﬁrm 2 can be eliminated
from the market, even when all consumers trust it, i.e, they correctly believe it to be
most likely the high quality producer.












, α<g (α),t h u sD2 =0 .






may or may not hold, depending on α. ii)
A necessary and suﬃcient condition for D2 > 0 is that α>g (α). This condition is
not always respected for r ≥ 1 and α<1/2, therefore, ∀r ∈ [1,+∞) there exists a
set Ω = {S : α<1/2, D1 > 0, D2 =0 } 6= ∅.
When the low quality is eﬃcient (r<1) ﬁrm 1 maintains dominance under
incomplete information, even if all consumers trust its rival. However, when beliefs
diﬀer widely across consumers entry deterrence may not be the most proﬁtable
strategy. The low quality producer may prefer to charge a higher price in order
to “cream” consumers who trust it more, while leaving those who trust it less to
the high quality producer. A necessary and suﬃcient condition for D2 > 0 is that
α>g (α), which implies suﬃciently dispersed beliefs.
8When the high quality is eﬃcient (r>1), the situation is not symmetric: in mov-
ing from a full to an incomplete information environment, dominance may change
hands. Under incomplete information, relative eﬃciency does not suﬃce in order
to guarantee the dominant position to the high quality, which also requires beliefs
to be strongly biased in favor of ﬁrm 2. When only one ﬁrm survives due to the
narrow width of the beliefs distribution, the (eﬃcient) ﬁrm 2 may be the one that
ﬁnds no market share in equilibrium; this is a totally ineﬃcient outcome. While this
can be expected when for some reason all (or most) consumers erroneously trust
ﬁrm 1, it is rather surprising that it may also happen when everybody trusts ﬁrm 2!
This result has a strong “lemons” ﬂavor: the presence of the low quality, along with
intense competition due to the relative homogeneity of beliefs, prevent ﬁrm 2 from
raising its price suﬃciently as to recover its cost. Suﬃciently dispersed beliefs, on
the other hand, may let the high quality survive, yet with a smaller market share
than its rival, an outcome that is also ineﬃcient.
Thus, in situations where the eﬃcient ﬁrm is also dominant, the incomplete
information market outcome is ineﬃcient as long as the beliefs are widely dispersed,
since this allows the ineﬃcient ﬁrm to ﬁnd a positive market share in equilibrium.
However, when r>1 and ﬁrm 1 is dominant, it is a narrow beliefs distribution that
m a yl e a dt oav e r yi n e ﬃcient outcome: unless beliefs are strongly favorable for ﬁrm
2,t h ei n e ﬃcient low quality monopolizes the market. Widely dispersed beliefs may
be less harmful in this case. Since the survival—let alone the dominance—of the high
quality credence good requires an eventually quite strong beliefs bias, the call for
some regulatory intervention is urgent in credence goods markets.
3 The introduction of a label
Assume that there are some substantial ﬁxed costs in verifying and certifying quality,
such that no individual would undertake to research for herself. For instance, in order
9to ﬁnd out whether the “fair trade coﬀee” is indeed equitable and not just a seller’s
trick to increase price, one must conduct an expensive research in order to track
down where the money goes. Since research is prohibitively expensive for most or
all individuals, it can only be conducted by the government, or by some specialized
organization.
Suppose at this point that some recognized authority certiﬁes the high quality
product with a label, for example “free of GMO” or “fair trade product.” If after
the label’s introduction all consumers know that ﬁrm 2 sells the high quality, so
that α = α =0 ,w es a yt h a tt h el a b e li sperfect. In other instances, the label may
improve consumers’ beliefs only partially, insofar as some or all α’s remain positive.
This may happen because the label is either not properly perceived or not fully
trusted by some or all consumers. We deﬁne such labels as imperfect.
3.1 Labels that establish full information (perfect labels)
The introduction of a perfect label restores full information, and since all con-
sumers have identical tastes, only one ﬁrm, the most eﬃcient, will survive in the
market. In the absence of externalities, this is also the most eﬃcient outcome.11
That a label must be granted by an authoritative third party does not also
imply that it must be mandatory. The possibility of voluntary labelling has already
been proposed in the literature.12 Since the informational imperfection mainly hurts
the high quality, it is natural to assume that (at least) the high quality producer
would voluntarily subject its product to inspection and labelling, even at a cost. We
investigate below both ﬁrms’ willingness to subject their product to certiﬁcation,
and show that in oligopolistic markets voluntary labelling may be problematic, even
when the ﬁrms bear no labelling cost.
11As long as the market is covered (demand is completely inelastic), any price change results
to a transfer between consumers and producers. Hence, market monopolization has no negative
impact per se.
12See, for instance, Segerson (1999), Crespi and Marette (2001) and Roe and Sheldon (2007).
10Recall that in the absence of ﬁxed cost the surviving quality cannot be priced
above a certain limit, otherwise the eliminated ﬁrm can re-enter and capture the
entire market. The following lemma is straightforward and needs no further proof.
Let a superscript PLindicate equilibrium values in the presence of a perfect label.
Lemma 2 After the introduction of a perfect label (full information), the Nash equi-
librium of the price game becomes:
a) for r ∈ [1,+∞),p PL
1 =0 , pPL
2 = ∆ with DPL
2 =1 ,D PL
1 =0 ;
b) for r ∈ [0,1],p PL
1 = c2 − ∆, pPL
2 = c2 with DPL
1 =1 ,D PL
2 =0 .
The following lemmata investigate a perfect label’s impact on the eﬃcient ﬁrm’s
proﬁt.
Lemma 3 When the low quality is the eﬃcient one (r ∈ [0,1]), the introduction of
a perfect label always reduces ﬁrm 1’s proﬁt.






for α>max{f(α),g(α)},a n d(2α − 1)∆ + c2 for
α ≤ g(α).13 In either case the proﬁti sa l w a y ss u p e r i o rt o(c2 − ∆), which is the
proﬁt under full information.
Lemma 3 shows that the label is undesirable for the low quality producer, even
when that ﬁrm is eﬃcient, and thus, the one to monopolize the market after qualities
have been revealed.14 By revealing the identity of the high quality producer to all
consumers, the label forces ﬁrm 1 to adopt a low-price entry deterring strategy when
accommodation would have been more proﬁtable.
13∀r ∈ [0,1] t h ec a s ew h e r eα ≤ f(α) is impossible from proposition 1.
14Equally undesirable for ﬁrm 1 is, therefore, to reveal itself as low quality producer, even when
it is eﬃcient.
11Lemma 4 When the high quality is eﬃcient (r ∈ [1,+∞)), if in the absence of a
label the market is monopolized by one or the other ﬁrm, then the introduction of
a perfect label always increases the high quality producer’s proﬁt. If, on the other
hand, in the absence of a label the resulting market structure is a duopoly, there are
cases where the label may reduce ﬁrm 2’s proﬁt.






for α>max{f(α),g(α)}, (1 − 2α)∆− c2 for α ≤
f(α),a n d0 for α ≤ g(α). In the last two cases, the proﬁti sa l w a y si n f e r i o rt o
(∆ − c2), the proﬁti na ne n v i r o n m e n tw i t hl a b e l.I nt h eﬁrst case, it is inferior or






4r and superior otherwise.











, α ≤ i(α) always holds.
To understand this result o n em u s td e c o m p o s et h ee ﬀect of the label to its three
components. The label helps ﬁrm 2 i) to expand its market, and ii) to reap a larger
part of the total quality premium consumers are willing to pay.15 However, iii) by
revealing ﬁrm 1’s true quality, the label forces that ﬁrm to lower its price, thus
making competition stiﬀer and creating pressure on ﬁrm 2’s price.16
The most interesting case arises when initially the market is a duopoly, becoming
a monopoly under the impact of the label, i.e., when α>max{f(α),g(α)}.D u et o
iii) above, there are instances characterized by a suﬃciently wide beliefs dispersion,
where in the absence of a label, the duopoly proﬁto fﬁrm 2 is higher than its
monopoly proﬁt under full information. In the absence of a label, the spread of
beliefs assures each ﬁr ma“ n i c h em a r k e t , ”a n dﬁrm 2 prefers to cater to its niche
market at a high price instead of vying for a larger market share.17 By revealing the
15The quality premium earned by ﬁrm 2 is increased by increasing the willingness to pay of
consumers who ap r i o r iput little trust to ﬁrm 2 as being the high quality producer. Under
imperfect information, the total premium ﬁrm 2 can earn by producing the high quality is (1 −
2α)∆− c2, which becomes larger as α shrinks.
16Even at zero market share, in the absence of ﬁxed cost ﬁrm 1 remains a potential competitor.
17Heterogeneity in beliefs transforms ﬁrm 1 into a puppy-dog (see Fudenberg and Tirole (1984)).
12low quality, a perfect label forces ﬁrm 1 to lower its price, thus inducing the high
quality to deter entry when accommodation would have been more proﬁtable.
Lemmata 3 and 4 state that there exist cases where the eﬃcient ﬁrm does not
wish the implementation of the label. While the eﬃcient low quality’s opposition
to the introduction of a label must somehow be anticipated, such opposition from
the eﬃcient high quality is rather intriguing, for the label is considered to beneﬁt
primarily the high quality. Obviously, the ineﬃcient ﬁrm (whether the high or the
low quality) never wishes labelling, for the label always forces it out of the market:
when the ineﬃcient ﬁrm is ﬁrm 2, the label triggers intense price competition; when
the ineﬃcient ﬁrm is ﬁrm 1, the label prevents it from cheating some consumers who
(erroneously) trust that ﬁrm. The following proposition is a corollary to lemmata 3
and 4:
Proposition 2 Voluntary labelling may be ineﬀective, and mandatory labelling nec-
essary, in the following situations: a) when the low quality is eﬃcient (r<1), b)
when the high quality is eﬃcient (r>1), but its relative eﬃciency is not too high
(1 <r<1.41)a n db e l i e f sa r es u ﬃciently dispersed (α ≥ i(α)).
The question of mandatory versus voluntary labelling has already received at-
tention in the literature. Segerson (1999) and Crespi and Marette (2001) compare
these types of certiﬁcation and conclude that, while voluntary certiﬁcation is gener-
ally suﬃcient, mandatory certiﬁcation may be necessary when there is a single safe
product seller who needs to bear high certiﬁcation costs (Crespi and Marette, 2001)
without receiving compensatory subsidies (Segerson, 1999).
Our analysis shows that, even if they pay no labelling costs, both ﬁrms may wish
to avoid labelling because it reduces proﬁts by intensifying competition. Hence, even
if a mandatory labelling scheme may generally be more costly than a voluntary one,
it may, in some circumstances, constitute the only available policy.18
18The case for mandatory labelling can be even stronger if both ﬁrms supply the same quality,
133.2 Imperfect labels
In many instances labels may not be able to restore full information. This
may happen because consumers either do not make full use of the label, or they
do not fully trust it. The former may occur when the label’s signal is not clear, or
suﬃciently publicized. Less than full trust occurs when consumers know (or simply
believe) that there is a probability of erroneous labelling, due to either imperfections
in verifying and labeling quality, or moral hazard on behalf of the authority that
grants the label.
Concerning moral hazard, we note that the distinction between experience and
credence goods also carries on to the corresponding labels. While the entity that
labels experience goods can build a reputation for the accuracy of its labels, such
reputation is generally impossible for organizations that label credence goods, due
to the non veriﬁable nature of the quality of those goods after consumption. This
implies that credence goods labels must be granted by organizations with already
established prestige.19 Even then, consumers may not be entirely certain about the
information conveyed by the label.
The introduction of a label, whether perfect or imperfect, corresponds to a mod-
iﬁcation of consumer beliefs. We assume that the label’s introduction increases no
consumer’s α, while it reduces α for at least some consumers. This assumption
rules out misleading, totally ineﬀective, or confusing labels and also implies that the
introduction of the label reduces the mean of the beliefs distribution.20
Recall that a key variable determining the aggressiveness in both ﬁrms’ pricing
behavior is the width of the beliefs distribution. Hence, the impact of the label on
since incomplete information creates diﬀe r e n t i a t i o n ,w h i c hi nt u r nh e l p sﬁrms avoid the Bertrand
paradox.
19For instance, while the quality and prestige of a scientiﬁc journal constitutes a label for a
published article, readership and citations of the article inﬂuence in turn the prestige of the journal.
Such a process is impossible for a label such as “fair trade coﬀee” for obvious reasons. Lizerri (1999)
and Emons (1997, 2001) focus on certiﬁcation performed by private organizations.
20A misleading label would increase all or some α’s while a confusing label would increase α for
some consumers and reduce it for others.
14the width of the beliefs distribution is crucial in evaluating the welfare eﬀects of the
label. In order to keep things simple, in what follows we assume that only one end
of the distribution is altered after the label’s introduction. Which end is aﬀected
depends on the nature of the label. As it will be explained below, labels that are
mostly perceived by the sophisticated consumers lower α, while those targeting the
unsophisticated ones lower α. D e s p i t et h ef a c tt h a tw eo n l yd e a lw i t hl a b e l st h a t
improve information, it can be shown that:
Proposition 3 In a duopoly market, the introduction of an imperfect label may
reduce welfare even if it improves all or some consumers’ information without mis-
leading any consumer. More speciﬁcally, an imperfect label reduces welfare when i)
the eﬃcient ﬁrm is also dominant and the label reduces α, or ii) the ineﬃcient low
quality is dominant and the label reduces α.
Proof. See Appendix 2.
Starting from cases where the label’s introduction does not aﬀect market struc-
ture, we observe that in monopoly markets, while the label aﬀects the surviving
product’s price, it leaves the consumption pattern unaﬀected. Total welfare remains
also unaﬀected, the price change representing only a transfer between consumers
and producers.21 In a duopoly market, when no ﬁrm is dominant, the label im-
proves welfare by helping the eﬃcient ﬁrm to gain a larger market share. When a
dominant ﬁrm exists then, by aﬀecting that ﬁrm’s pricing behavior, the label may
reduce welfare in two cases. First, when the eﬃcient ﬁrm (whether high or low
quality) is also dominant and the label is dispersion-increasing (i.e., one that re-
duces α), since the label allows the eﬃcient ﬁrm to cater to fewer consumers at a
higher price. Second, when the ineﬃcient low quality is dominant and the label is
21In all cases the price is set so as to extract the entire surplus of the least trusting consumer.
When ﬁrm 2 monopolizes the market, a label that lowers α allows it to charge a higher price and
extract more consumer surplus. When ﬁrm 1 is the eﬃcient monopolist, a label that lowers α
translates into a lower price.
15dispersion-reducing (i.e., one that reduces α), since by intensifying competition the
label further reduces the market share of the eﬃcient high quality.22
When the label alters market structure, once again its impact on the variance of
beliefs cannot be neglected. Dispersion-increasing labels may transform a monopoly
into a duopoly, while dispersion-reducing labels may have exactly the opposite eﬀect.
The welfare impact of the label obviously depends on which market form is more
desirable. When the eﬃcient ﬁrm is also dominant, dispersion-reducing labels are
welfare enhancing. However, when the ineﬃcient low quality is the dominant ﬁrm,
dispersion-reducing labels may eliminate the already insuﬃcient (from a social point
of view) market share of the high quality and, thus, reduce welfare.
That an information improving label may end up being welfare reducing even in
the absence of externalities is, to our knowledge, a result that has not been stressed in
the literature. It calls for careful examination of the interaction between the initial
market structure and the type of label, to the extend that this type determines
whether beliefs dispersion will increase or decrease after the label.
Casual observation reveals the existence of substantial amounts of information—
other than label related—concerning credence goods: television documentaries, mag-
azine and newspaper articles, advertizing, etc. The problem is that, since experience
cannot corroborate or refute that information in the absence of a perfect label ini-
tial beliefs about a product’s quality remain “gut feelings.” Nevertheless, one would
expect to ﬁnd more sophisticated consumers inhabiting the low end of the beliefs dis-
tribution (i.e., being closer to the truth) since such consumers can better screen and
process the available information than their unsophisticated counterparts.23 Labels,
22If one allows for both ends of the distribution to be lowered, the same mechanisms are still
at work but the ﬁnal eﬀect is hard to predict, since it depends on the relative magnitude of the
changes.
23We do not imply that by screening and processing all available information one can identify
the high quality with certainty, nor that a sophisticated consumer will always have more accurate
beliefs than an unsophisticated one. We simply mean that a) among “junk” or misleading pieces
of information there are also some useful ones that can help improve one’s idea about who sells
the high quality, and b) sophisticated consumers are more likely to take advantage of those pieces.
16on the other hand, may diﬀer by their nature: some contain hard technical informa-
tion whereas others simply make already existing information easier to assimilate.
While everybody can beneﬁt from both kinds of labels, the former will most likely
have a greater impact on the beliefs of the more sophisticated consumers, tending
to lower α more relatively to α,a n dvice-versa for the latter. For instance, the
mandatory enumeration of a product’s ingredients on its package may be considered
as a label containing rather technical information, which can improve a sophisti-
cated consumer’s beliefs while being of little help to the unsophisticated one.24 On
the other hand, a sticker emphasizing some information that could also have been
extracted otherwise clearly targets the latter category of consumers.25
Our analysis suggests that these two types of labels aﬀect the pricing behavior
of ﬁrms diﬀerently and have diﬀerent consequences on welfare. The former, by in-
creasing beliefs dispersion softens price competition while the latter does exactly
the opposite. Proposition 3 describes the situations where each one of them can be
welfare reducing. In most cases, labels targeting the unsophisticated consumers—
hence, reducing beliefs dispersion—are better, since they cause no harm and most
likely improve welfare. A notable exception is the (not unlikely) situation where,
due to cost diﬀerences and belief distribution parameters, the ineﬃcient low quality
is dominant: a label that provides hard technical information targeting the sophis-
ticated consumer softens competition through increasing beliefs dispersion, helping,
thus, the high quality to acquire a larger market share.
Our analysis reveals that the diﬀerence between perfect and imperfect labels
is not just quantitative, but also qualitative: perfect labels can never be welfare
24What we have in mind is chemical substances with exotic names or the infamous “e-’s” on
European packages. An unsophisticated (and in most cases just average) consumer can at best
rank products according to the (least) number of such ingredients they contain, without much idea
about the seriousness of each ingredient’s health consequences.
25For example, labelling a product as “juice,” as opposed to “nectar” or “fruit drink,” makes
readily visible information that can also be extracted by reading the ingredients on the package.
The “Blauer Engel” eco-label in Germany oﬀers a credence good example of an easily understood
label.
17reducing, while imperfect labels can be so. Special care is, therefore, needed with
the latter.26 Our results also stress the need of improving on all three factors that
may make a label imperfect: i) its accuracy, ii) the trust consumers place on the
organization that grants the label, and iii) how easy it is for consumers to understand
the label. Investments must, therefore, be also devoted to educating consumers
about the label’s meaning as well as to strengthening the label’s reputation.
4C o n c l u s i o n s
We show that when consumers are uncertain about the identity of the ﬁrm that
produces the high quality, the high quality producer is at disadvantage, due to her
higher cost. This disadvantage may not disappear even when the beneﬁts from con-
suming the high quality are well worth the cost diﬀerence and all consumers’ beliefs
about the high quality producer are in the right direction. Our model partly explains
the diﬃculty encountered by some high quality credence goods —environmentally
friendly products, organic vegetables, fair trade products, etc.—to acquire the domi-
nant market share they deserve from an eﬃciency point of view, or even any market
share at all.
Depending on the distribution of consumer beliefs about the identity of the high
q u a l i t yp r o d u c e r ,t h em a r k e to u t c o m em a yo rm a yn o tb ee ﬃcient. In the latter case,
a perfect label is, as expected, welfare improving but it may need to be mandatory
in order to have an impact. Voluntary labelling will, in many instances, be avoided
by both ﬁrms—not just the low quality or the ineﬃcient ﬁrm—since it reduces their
proﬁts. On the other hand, imperfect labels, i.e., labels that just improve consumers’
beliefs without restoring full information, may be welfare reducing. When the use of
26By stressing the qualitative importance of giving a label maximum accuracy, our model pro-
vides some support for the U.S. Food and Drug Administration’s alleged tendency of not approving
a new drug until being certain about its eﬀects. While such policy must be primarily due to fear
of health and legal consequences, it has the advantage of creating a sort of credible label: once a
new drug is approved, consumers must be certain that it represents a superior product, even with
respect to any long term health eﬀects (we are grateful to a referee for pointing this out to us).
18a ni m p e r f e c tl a b e li su n a v o i d a b l e ,i ti si m p o r t a n tt ok n o wi t sr e l a t i v ei m p a c to nt h e
sophisticated and the unsophisticated consumers. When the eﬃcient quality is also
dominant, it is best to reduce beliefs dispersion through labels that can be easily
observed and understood by the unsophisticated consumer. When the ineﬃcient low
quality dominates the market, though, labels conveying hard information, mostly
intended for sophisticated consumers, are preferable.
The analysis is quite robust if one allows some consumers to be fully informed.27
Assume ﬁrst that uninformed consumers cannot observe the informed ones. The
presence of informed consumers helps the eﬃcient high quality to survive: in situ-
ations where ﬁrm 2 would have found no market share, now it can at least cater
to the informed consumers at the full information price. This relaxes competition
and allows ﬁrm 1 to raise its own price, leaving also some uninformed consumers to
ﬁrm 2.28 Hence, the presence of informed consumers creates a positive externality,
beneﬁcial to some non-informed ones. When the high quality is dominant, however,
this externality may well be negative, since the presence of informed consumers may
induce cream-skimming by ﬁrm 2, thus leaving more consumers to purchase the low
quality. While the presence of informed consumers may aﬀect the magnitude of the
welfare loss in the absence of a label, the policy prescription remains along the lines
d e v e l o p e di nt h i sp a p e r .
When the non-informed consumers can observe the informed ones, a new option
is opened to them: waiting during a time period and observing the informed con-
sumers’ choice.29 The discount factor (or, alternatively, the time lag) between the
two periods becomes now a key variable. When the discount factor approaches 1
everybody waits and the informational problem disappears. For suﬃciently low val-
ues of the discount factor, though, no consumer chooses to wait and observe, which
27The group of informed consumers may well be the result of a label that is perceived and/or
understood by only a group of consumers.
28Competition is relaxed since in the absence of informed consumers the high quality would have
been available at marginal cost, while now it is available at its full information price.
29We are grateful to a referee for pointing out this case.
19takes us back to the situation described in this paper. For intermediate values of
the discount factor, however, some consumers (most probably those around α = .5)
will choose to wait. Waiting most likely favors the eﬃcient ﬁrm, but any further
conclusion would be highly speculative.
How are these results aﬀected by allowing free entry? In this model, dominance
depends on both relative eﬃciency and beliefs. Hence, the market outcome strongly
depends on how consumers’ beliefs will be aﬀected by entry, and no ap r i o r ipre-
diction can be made. Ex-post welfare will also be aﬀected by the true quality of
the entrant’s product. Since in almost all cases entry intensiﬁes competition, the
main mechanism identiﬁed in this paper must be present: by lowering prices, free
entry squeezes the market share of the non-dominant ﬁrm.30 When the eﬃcient
high quality is in the non-dominant position, entry can reduce welfare by reducing
or eliminating its market share. One can, however, create many diﬀerent alternative
scenarios where entry is beneﬁcial.
Appendix
Appendix 1: The Nash equilibrium of the price game whithout label.
From the deﬁnition of the consumer indiﬀerent between the two products, we
obtain the following demand functions : i) If p2 ≤ p1−(2α−1)∆ ⇐⇒ αm ≥ α,t h e n
D1(p1,p 2)=0and D2(p1,p 2)=1 , ii) if p2 +( 2 α − 1)∆ <p 1 <p 2 +( 2 α − 1)∆ ⇐⇒












2(α−α)∆. iii) if p2 ≥ p1 − (2α − 1)∆ ⇐⇒ αm ≤ α,t h e nD1(p1,p 2)=1and
D2(p1,p 2)=0 . Recall that the market is assumed to be fully covered, which implies
Uh + Ul ≥ p1 + p2.
30Consider, for instance, the special case where a potential entrant (say a foreign ﬁrm) does
not gain market share in equilibrium, while . its presence (even at zero market share) reduces
consumers’ trust towards one or both incumbents. This reduces proﬁt margins, thus inducing the
dominant ﬁrm to seek a larger market share instead of creaming consumers. Although a very
special case, this example illustrates the impact of new ﬁrms on the incumbents’ behavior.
20Maximizing ﬁrm 1’s proﬁtw eg e tt h a tﬁrm’s best reply function: i) if p2 >
(2(α − 2α)+1 ) ∆ the duopoly proﬁto fﬁrm 1 is inferior to its monopoly proﬁta n d
ﬁrm 1 sets the highest price that keeps ﬁrm 2 out of the market : p1 =( 2 α−1)∆+p2,
ii) if ∆(1 − 2α) <p 2 < (2(α − 2α)+1 ) ∆ the duopoly proﬁto fﬁrm 1 is superior to
its monopoly proﬁta n dﬁrm 1 sets its best reply to a value of p2 that guarantees







2 ,i i i )i fp2 < ∆(1 − 2α) ﬁrm 1 can not
have positive proﬁts and drops out of the market setting p1 = c1 =0 . Hence, for






with r ≡ ∆/c2, ﬁrm 2 is dominant.
Similarly, the best response function for ﬁrm 2 is: i) if p1 > (2(2α−α)−1)∆+c2
then ﬁrm 2 sets p2 =( 1−2α)∆+p1,i i )i f∆(2α−1)+c2 <p 1 < (2(2α−α)−1)∆+c2








2 , iii) if p1 < ∆(2α−1)+c2 then ﬁrm 2 sets:






, ﬁrm 1 is dominant.
Using both ﬁrms’ best response functions we determine the Nash equilibrium of
the game. When both ﬁrms have positive market shares in equibrium, equilibrium
prices and quantities are:31 p1 =
(2(2α−α)−1)∆+c2
3 with D1 =
(2(2α−α)−1)∆+c2
6(α−α)∆ ,a n d
p2 =
(2(α−2α)+1)∆+2c2
3 with D2 =
(2(α−2α)+1)∆−c2
6(α−α)∆ . The equilibrium proﬁts are: π1 =
(2(α − α)∆)(D1)
2 > 0 and π2 =( 2 ( α − α)∆)(D2)
2 > 0.








and for D2 > 0 it is α>g (α) ≡ 2α − 1
2(1 − 1
r).W h e n
α ≤ f(α), D1 =0and ﬁrm 2 c o v e r st h ee n t i r em a r k e ta tp r i c ep2 =( 1−2α)∆ >c 2,
according to its reaction function.32 Similarly, when α ≤ g(α), D2 =0and ﬁrm 1
covers the entire market with p1 =( 2 α − 1)∆ + c2 > 0.33
Appendix 2: P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3.
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i.e. when (1 − 2α)∆ = c2.A s
∂p2








i.e., when (2α − 1)∆ + c2 =0 .A s
∂p1




21A label reduces welfare if and only if it increases the ineﬃcient quality’s sales.
Hence:
i) When the high quality is eﬃcient (r ∈ [1,+∞)), a label that reduces α reduces
wefare if and only if ∂D1







Moreover, when the low quality is eﬃcient (r ∈ [0,1]), ﬁrm 1 is also the dominant
ﬁrm (see Proposition 1). In this environment a label that reduces α always reduces
wefare: ∂D2






,w h i c hi sa l w a y st r u e .
ii) When the high quality is eﬃcient (r ∈ [1,+∞)), a label that reduces α reduces
welfare if and only if ∂D1







We may note that when the low quality is eﬃcient (r ∈ [0,1]), a label that reduces
α never reduces welfare (∂D2
∂α < 0 is never true).
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